Naylor Against World Wide Trading of Weapons in Wages of Crime Essay

The foremost reason cited for pessimism with regard to global arms trading is technological smuggling, overseas systems’ reverse engineering, and the intense merchant rivalry when it comes to delivering more superior offset agreements, increasing advanced weapon manufacture capability worldwide. The above trend has brought about a significant decline in the need for buying on the global market (Naylor, 2004). One may witness synergy between trade of illegal imports, weapon proliferation and political revolts. On the face of it, an abrupt decrease was apparent in global arms trade following the Cold War. But if one delves deeper, one will find several reasons suggesting the weapon proliferation issue hasn’t dwindled similarly. One factor is, decreased measured weapon flow has accompanied a seeming growth in arms sales via the global black market that is not officially recorded.



Furthermore, a mere analysis of total value fails to account for the dangerous move in reasons underlying demand. The major part of the weapons proliferation during the Cold War wasn’t in preparedness for a real war; rather it can be regarded as the biggest Potlatch in world history. Potlatch is a kind of ceremony commonly held by Pacific Northwestern natives for ensuring political competition didn’t end in intra-community war (Naylor, 2004). Likewise, the aforementioned weapons proliferation of the Cold War (so far as it wasn’t, for the West, a mere huge arms sector boondoggle) saw participating nations overtly wasting maximum possible national resources for stockpiling arms never intended for use. The aim was spending opponents into yielding. Currently, however, as Cold War limitations have been gotten rid of, one can safely assume that arms now purchased are actually intended for application and not just for dissuasion or show (Naylor, 2004; Richard, 2002), with the outcome being increased killing power for every unit of currency expended.



Thirdly, measured total value decline is partly an outcome of price cuts, rather than quantity decreases. At one time, first-hand AK-47s’ wholesale rate was roughly 12.5 dollars. In the 90’s, Russians were able to acquire first-hand guns at 30-40 dollars, and Cambodians bought secondhand guns for a mere eight dollars (which was the Ugandan rate per chicken, or the rate of a maize bag in Mozambique or Angola) (Naylor, 2004). Irrespective of the rate, the weapon’s killing efficiency remains the same. This trend was supported by the comparative move to less-advanced, reasonably-priced material having established…